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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(5) and the Order of this Court dated May 18, 2001.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD' OF REVIEW
Issues presented by Bradley's petition:
(1)

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the "reasonably debatable"

standard in reviewing this legislative decision by the Payson City Council.
(2)

Whether the Court of Appeals appropriately determined that this legislative

decision of the Payson City Council to deny Bradley's rezoning request satisfied the
reasonably debatable standard.
The same standard applies to both issues. On certiorari, this Court reviews the
decision of the Court of Appeals for correction of error and does not review the decision of
the trial court. Harper v. Summit County. 2001 UT 10,1110, 26 P.3d 193, 195.
Issue presented by Payson City's cross-petition:
(3)

Whether the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that it has original

appellate jurisdiction over district court review of land use decisions by the governing body
of municipalities and other units of local government under the Municipal Land Use
Development and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-101, etseq}

1

This same analysis applies to final decisions under the County Land Use
Development and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-101, etseq.
1

On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for correction
of error and does not review the decision of the trial court. Harper v. Summit County,
2001 UT 10,1110, 26 P.3d 193,195.
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3):
(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j):
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i):
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions
of the state or other local agencies;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises from the Payson City Council's exercise of its legislative discretion to

deny Petitioners3 (jointly the "Bradleys") two applications to rezone property located within
2

the City (the "Property") from low density residential/agricultural use to high density
residential uses. The Property was mostly zoned R-l-A which is a low density residential
agricultural zoning with a minimum lot size of one acre, permitting the keeping of animals.
One portion of the property was zoned I-l industrial. Bradleys' first application in January
of 1996 sought to have their property rezoned R-2-75, a higher density multi-family
residential zoning. Bradleys' second application in March of 1996 sought rezoning to
R-l-9, a higher density single family residential zoning, which effectively superceded the
earlier application. The City Council voted to deny both applications.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Bradleys sought judicial review of the City Council's denial of their rezoning request

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001, claiming that the City's decision was arbitrary,
capricious and illegal. On March 21, 1998, the City filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that, based upon the legislative record, the City had acted appropriately and within
its legislative discretion in evaluating and denying the rezoning request. Bradleys
subsequently filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and opposed the City's motion
claiming that the City's decision was arbitrary and capricious.
By Memorandum Decision filed on January 22, 1999, the trial court ruled that the
City Council's decision was arbitrary and capricious. It based its ruling on a finding that the
reasons for the City's decision were (1) without sufficient factual basis and (2) based on
citizen opposition. The court also indicated that it had reviewed the zoning maps and,
substituting its judgment for the legislative discretion of the City Council, reached the
3

conclusion that there was no reason not to approve the rezoning. Ignoring the fact that the
second application which triggered this legal challenge requested rezoning to the R-l-9
designation, the trial court ordered that "the zone change from R-l-A to R-2-75 is hereby
approved.33 The court's Order granting summary judgment was entered on March 16,
1999.
On April 5,1999, the City filed with the trial court its notice of appeal of the
decision to this Court. The City's Docketing Statement was filed with this Court on
April 26,1999. By Order dated April 27,1999, this Court transferred the appeal to the
Court of Appeals, stating that the appeal was not within the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court.
The City argued to the Court of Appeals that the trial court had incorrecdy applied
the "substantial evidence33 standard in evaluating the exercise of legislative discretion by the
City Council and had inappropriately substituted its judgment for that of the Council. The
City further argued that under the "reasonably debatable33 standard applicable to judicial
review of a local legislative proceeding, such as a zoning decision, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9-1001, the City's denial of Bradleys3 request was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court had erroneously applied the
"substantial evidence33 standard in reviewing the City's decision. It issued its opinion in
Bradley v. Payson City Corp.. 2001 UT App. 9,17 P.3d 1160 holding that the more
deferential "reasonably debatable33 measure is the appropriate standard of review of a
municipal legislative decision.
4

This Court now has an opportunity to eliminate any potential confusion regarding
the appropriate standard of review of municipal land use decisions and reiterate the
well-recognized and important distinction between "legislative35 and "administrative" or
"quasi-judicial" decisions and the standard of review applicable to each. The City is also
asking this Court to resolve the question of original appellate jurisdiction over land use
decisions of local units of government, such as municipalities and counties.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Property at issue lies largely within an area zoned R-l-A, low density

agricultural residential with one acre minimum lot size with some of the Property located in
an 1-1 industrial zone. (R. 70-71.) The R-l-A zoning permits the raising of horses,
chickens and other animals consistent with the agricultural nature of the zone. The R-l-A
zone is abutted on four sides by property zoned for industrial use. (R. 42-43.)
The 1995 Payson City General Plan in effect at the time the Bradleys' request for
rezoning encourages residential areas to be located east of the 1-15 buffer and establishes as
a long-term policy, goal and objective the enactment of zoning ordinances utilizing the
natural buffer of 1-15 and providing for the 1-1 industrial zoning designation in areas west
of 1-15. The general plan further encourages the concentration of 1-1 industrial zoning in
the natural commercial corridor between the Union Pacific and D&RW rail lines and
Interstate exits #254 and 252. (R. 50, 52.)
In January of 1996 David S. White applied to Payson City for rezoning of property
owned by Dale H. Tanner, Lewis J. Peterson and R. Dale Whitelock from R-l-A zoning to
5

R-2-75, a relatively high density multifamily residential zoning designation (the "White
rezoning"). (R. 177-78.) The request came before the Planning Commission on
February 6,1996. At that time, Mr. White indicated his desire that the area involved be
rezoned to provide rental housing within the City. Mr. Whitelock, one of the property
owners represented by Mr. White, indicated that the area was no longer suitable for him to
raise bobcats, so he had to relocate and was in favor of the rezoning. Commissioner Tuttle
expressed the concern that many who had moved into the area had done so to have one acre
lots. Chairman Stewart expressed concern that the general plan anticipated industrial
development in the surrounding areas. The Commission voted to recommend the
scheduling of a public hearing to consider the request. (R. 62-63, 166-67.)
The public hearing on the rezoning request was held March 20, 1996, before the
Planning Commission. The Commission received a petition signed by 38 property owners
in the area affected by the rezoning request opposing the White rezoning and stating a
preference that the area remain zoned R-l-A. (R. 159-60) Although the majority of public
comments opposed the White rezoning, either based on a preference for animal property,
an interest in maintaining the character of the area, or concerns over infrastructure, several
comments were in favor of the rezoning. After the public discussion, the Commission
recommended that the City Council deny the request to rezone the Property from R-l-A to
R-2-75. (R. 59-60,153-55.)
On March 20, 1996, in a City Council meeting following the Planning Commission
meeting, a public hearing was held on the White rezoning application. In addition to
6

public comments about retaining the current zoning for raising animals and preserving the
nature of the neighborhood, other comments raised concerns about traffic levels in the area.
The Council voted to deny the White rezoning based upon the general plan, traffic
concerns, and the Planning Commission recommendation. (R. 64-65).
Prior to the City's denial of the White rezoning request, Louis J. Peterson filed a
request to have the area encompassing his property and others rezoned from R-l-A to
R-l-9 (the "Peterson rezoning") on March 8, 1996.2 The reason given was cc[t]he size of
the lots are too large for the familys [sic] to handle." (R. 145.)
On April 11, 1996, the Planning Commission first considered the Peterson
rezoning. The Commission noted that the Gordon Taylor property was not properly
included in the request because it was outside the City limits and no annexation request for
the property had been received. It also noted that an additional property would be affected,
the "Toleman property which is currently Industrial would become Residential." The
Commission voted to recommend approval of the Peterson rezoning and set it for public
hearing subject to removal of the Gordon Taylor property from the request. (R. 122-23.)
The Peterson rezoning came before the City Council for public hearing on May 22,
1996. Included in the public input were comments by representatives of businesses in the
abutting industrial area including Associated Foods, indicating its concern that truck noise

2

In their summary judgment memorandum, Bradleys stated that the application
was also on behalf of R. Dale Whitelock, Robert Bradley, Gordon Taylor and Pete Schmidt
to have their properties rezoned. The application does not indicate the names of these
individuals, but the area to be rezoned includes property owned by them.
7

will cause residents to seek action against it, and Muir Roberts, worrying about whether
residents would tolerate the noise and smell of its packing facilities. After closing the public
hearing, the Council voted to deny the Peterson rezoning request. (R. 307-310.)
Bradleys commenced this action by Verified Complaint dated March 26,1997, and
filed April 1, 1997. (R. 1-16.) Pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment by the
parties, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision on January 22,1999. (R. 341-43).
The summary judgment Order was entered on March 16, 1999 (R. 344-345); and the
City's notice of appeal was filed on April 5, 1999. (R. 350-351.)
After the appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeals and before oral argument,
Bradleys sought transfer of the appeal to this Court. The Court of Appeals concluded that
it had original appellate jurisdiction to decide the appeal and proceeded with oral argument.
It issued its opinion on January 11, 2001, holding that the trial court had applied the
incorrect standard of review to the City's legislative land use decisions and that under the
applicable "reasonably debatable" standard, the City's denial of the rezoning requests was
not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2001 UT App. 9, 17 P.3d
1160.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As noted by the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Payson City Council to deny
the Bradleys5 rezoning request is clearly legislative in character, rather than administrative.
This Court has long recognized the important and significant distinction between the
appropriate standard for judicial review of legislative actions as opposed to administrative
8

decisions of a municipality, granting substantial deference and broad discretion to legislative
land use decisions. This deference has evolved and been articulated as a "reasonably
debatable" measure in which the Court upholds a legislative decision if there is any rational
basis to support a municipality's exercise of legislative discretion, or, in other words, if it is
reasonably debatable that the decision will promote the public health, safety and general
welfare. The Court has scrupulously avoided substituting its judgment for that of local
legislative decision makers and has recognized that merely because the information
presented to the governing body may have also justified some reasonable alternative
conclusion, that does not render the decision made by the City arbitrary, capricious or
illegal.
Rather than the appropriate "reasonably debatable" standard, the trial court applied a
"substantial evidence" standard to the City's decision. It held that the evidence did not
support the City's denial of the rezoning request. It then reviewed zoning maps and
substituted its judgment for the legislative discretion of the City Council and reversed the
City's decision.
Before the Court of Appeals, the City argued that the trial court's use of the
"substantial evidence" standard was incorrect as a matter of law and should be reversed.
Bradleys argued that the legislative enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 combined
with this Court's ruling in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. Springville City.
1999 UT 25,11 23, 979 P.2d 332 mandated the application of die "substantial evidence"
standard to the City's legislative land use decisions.
9

There is no evidence of a legislative intent to overrule the long-standing, wellestablished rule of law affording legislative decisions of local governmental entities broad
discretion and judicial deference. Absent some clear indication of such intent, it is
inappropriate to find that the language of § 10-9-1001 imposes a "one-size-fits-all" standard
on both legislative and administrative decisions of local governments. The Court of
Appeals correctly concluded that the legislature did not do so.
In Springville Citizens, this Court used the "substantial evidence" standard in
reviewing the city's processing of a PUD application under its governing ordinances.
However, the actions being reviewed in that case were clearly administrative in nature. The
Court's authority for the "substantial evidence" standard was Patterson v. Utah County Bd.
of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 1995), a review of an administrative decision by a
board of adjustment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-708. There is no indication in
the Springville Citizens opinion that this Court intended to overrule 50 years of wellreasoned case law recognizing the significant distinction between the appropriate standard
for judicial review of legislative decisions as opposed to administrative actions of a
municipality. The Court of Appeals' careful analysis of this issue demonstrates the
soundness of its conclusion. The deferential "reasonably debatable" standard should
continue to govern judicial review of legislative land use decisions.
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the "reasonably debatable" standard to
conclude the City's denial of the rezoning was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Under
that deferential standard, it makes no difference whether there is also evidence which might
10

support an alternative outcome or that the Court may disagree with the City's decision. So
long as there is a rational basis in the record in support of the City's decision, it is
"reasonably debatable55 whether it is in furtherance of the public health, safety and general
welfare and therefore must be upheld. The Court of Appeals correctly applied that standard
in upholding the City's exercise of legislative discretion to deny the Bradleys5 rezoning
request.
The City's cross-petition asks this Court to review the issue of original appellate
jurisdiction of land use decisions by municipalities and other units of local government.
There is no statutory basis for vesting the Court of Appeals with original appellate
jurisdiction over district court review of local land use decisions. The Court of Appeals5
conclusion, while perhaps understandable in light of the directive from this Court and the
apparent confusion that exists in this area of the law, is nevertheless contrary to the plain
and unambiguous language of the statute and should be reversed. Land use decisions by
cities and counties are not "adjudicative proceedings55 of "agencies,55 either by statutory
definition or prior case law. As a matter of public policy, it is important that final decisions
of the legislative body of counties and municipalities be potentially reviewable on direct
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, rather than only by way of a petition for writ of
certiorari.

11

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANT AND
SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE
STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS
AS OPPOSED TO ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT.
Bradleys do not dispute that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is

fundamentally a legislative act. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah
1992). See also Sherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988) ("the
passage of general zoning ordinances and the determination of zoning policy [are] properly
vested in the legislative branch."); Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633, 635-36
(Utah 1961) (zoning is a legislative function carrying with it wide discretion);
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976)
(reviewing rezoning as a legislative action).
The legislative process involved in making policy decisions regarding land use issues
is inherently political in nature and requires the governing body to exercise broad discretion
in weighing the interests of all concerned in furtherance of the general welfare. Marshall v.
Salt Lake City, 141 P.2d 704, 709-10 (Utah 1943) (noting varied interests considered in
creating zoning plan); Tenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1156 (Utah 1983) (ccbroad matters
of a political nature are best determined in the legislative branch of government").
Precisely because such legislative decisions on planning and zoning issues affect such
a broad range of public interests, they have traditionally been granted substantial judicial
deference based upon the subjective nature of the issues and the constitutional separation of
12

powers doctrine. Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999
UT 25,11 23, 979 P.2d 332, 336 ("A municipality's land use decisions are entitled to a great
deal of deference.53); 1 Ziegler, Rathkopf s the Law of Zoning and Planning (4 ed. 1989,
rev. 2001) § 3:13 at 3-28 to 3-32 (cited herein as "Rathkopfs"). The burden of
overcoming this deference and presumption of validity lies with the plaintiff who is
challenging the validity of the decision. Id. See also Call v. City of West Tordan, 614 P.2d
1257, 1258 (Utah 1980) (ordinance passed within the scope of legislatively granted power
is accorded a presumption of constitutional validity); Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 398
P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1965) (cc[W]e are more than cognizant of the proposition that the
governing body of a city is endowed with considerable latitude in determining the proper
uses of property within its confines.53).
This Court has traditionally granted municipalities considerable discretion in the
exercise of their legislative power in the area of land use and zoning.
In the review of zoning cases the function of the court is narrow and
its scope is limited to a determination of whether or not the action of
the Board of County Commissioners as a legislative body is illegal,
arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious. No contention is made that
the county did not act within its grant of powers from the legislature
in its adoption of the original zoning ordinance. The prior decisions
of this court without exception have laid down the rule that the
exercise of the zoning power is a legislative function to be exercised by
the legislative bodies of the municipalities. The wisdom of the zoning
plan, its necessity, the nature and boundaries of the district to be
zoned are matters which lie solely within that discretion. It is the
policy of this court as enunciated in its prior decisions that it will
avoid substituting its judgment for that of the legislative body of the
municipality.

13

Crestview-HoUaday Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Engh Floral Co.? 545 P.2d 1150, 1151-52
(Utah 1976) (emphasis added).
Traditionally, the burden a plaintiff bears in overcoming the presumption of validity
is substantial.
While the most common statement of the degree of proof required to
overcome the presumption of validity is that the issue must be
removed from the area of reasonable debate, the courts have used a
variety of language to describe what all agree is an extraordinary
burden. A number of courts require that the litigant asserting
invalidity prove by "clear and convincing55 evidence that the ordinance
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or otherwise invalid. Some courts require
"clear and affirmative55 evidence of invalidity, and others simply require
that the invalidity be "clearly55 shown or conclusively demonstrated.
1 Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning (4 ed. 1996) § 3.21 at 136-37 (referred to
herein as "Anderson55).
On appeal from a legislative land use decision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
evidence leads only to the conclusion that the legislative decision was arbitrary, capricious or
illegal. Merely because the information presented during the legislative process might also
lead to another possible reasonable outcome does not render the decision invalid, the
appellate court must defer to the city's exercise of legislative discretion. Gayland, supra.
In stark contrast, the "substantial evidence55 standard arises in the context of the case
law addressing administrative or quasi-judicial land use decisions and does not apply to
legislative decisions. See Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah
App. 1998) (city's administrative interpretation of its zoning ordinances); Wells v. Bd. of
Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp.. 936 P.2d 1102 (Utah App. 1997) (board of
14

adjustment decision denying variance); Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685
P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984) (same); Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d
602 (Utah App. 1995) (review of trial court's finding of arbitrary and capricious action by
county in approving special exception to zoning ordinance); Davis County v. Clearfield
City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988) (denial of conditional use permit); First Nafl Bank
of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990)
(administrative evaluation of property for tax purposes); Chambers v. Smithfield City, 714
P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986) (administrative procedures for processing variance requests). There
is no question that Utah law applies the "substantial evidence" measure to the evaluation of
administrative and quasi-judicial decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
This Court has long recognized the clear distinction between administrative and
legislative activities. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Sandy City. 879
P.2d 1379, 1383 (Utah App. 1994) (improper to delegate legislative function to board);
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d 212, 220 (Utah 1992) ("Boards of
adjustment. . . lack the authority to determine zoning classifications of their own accord.")
See also 5 Anderson § 21.04 at 699 ("[A] board of adjustment is an administrative body
which may be authorized to exercise quasi-judicial powers. . . It is a body without legislative
authority.")
There is no Utah case law which would support the application of a substantial
evidence standard to judicial review of a legislative decision bytitlegoverning body of a
municipality. Instead, this Court has always applied a highly deferential standard of review
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to the question of whether a local legislative decision is arbitrary and capricious. Walker v.
Brigham City. 856 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1993) (arbitrary and capricious standard measured
as "wholly discordant to reason and justice35); Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v.
Engh Floral Co.. 545 P.2d 1150,1151-52 (Utah 1976) (deferring to judgment of county
commission, finding zoning not to be arbitrary and capricious); Naylor v. Salt Lake City
Corp.. 410 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1966) (measure of arbitrary and capricious is whether
"there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify [the legislative action]").
n.

NEITHER THE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT OF § 10-9-1001 NOR
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN SPRINGVILLE CITIZENS OVERRULES
THE WELL-ESTABLISHED LAW GRANTING SUBSTANTIAL
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO A MUNICIPALITIES5 LEGISLATIVE
DECISIONS.
Bradleys argued to the Court of Appeals and claim here that the standard applicable

to judicial review of local legislative decisions should be the "substantial evidence" measure.
In doing so, they rely on the legislature's enactment of a statutory basis for judicial review of
municipal land use decisions in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 and this Court's opinion in
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. Springville Citv. 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d
332.
In rejecting Bradleys' arguments, the Court of Appeals relied upon the decision of an
earlier Court of Appeals panel in Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App. 31, 997
P.2d 321. In a carefully reasoned analysis, the Harmon City court determined that "the
Utah Legislature did not adopt a one-size-fits-all standard of review for legislative and
administrative/adjudicative functions when it codified the 'arbitrary, capricious or illegal3
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language of section 10-9-1001." Harmon City at 1115, 997 P.2d 325. After analyzing
Springville Citizens and the extensive Utah law discussing review of legislative land use
decisions, the Harmon City court concluded that cc[w]e do not think that the supreme court
intended to sweep aside the long-standing distinction between a municipality's legislative
and administrative acts. . ." Id. at U 24, 997 P.2d 327. The Harmon City court's analysis
of these issues was sound and the Court of Appeals was correct in relying on that analysis
and applying the reasonably debatable standard to Bradleys3 appeal.
A.

THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT CREATE A "ONE-SIZE-FITSALL53 STANDARD FOR THE REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AND LEGISLATIVE LAND USE DECISIONS BY
MUNICIPALITIES.

Bradleys argue that the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 providing for
judicial review of all municipal land use decisions is a legislatively created ccone-size-fits-all"
standard for reviewing all land use decisions, whether legislative or administrative. The
language at issue is that limiting a reviewing court's analysis to a determination of "only
whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9-1001 (3) (b). Bradleys argue that because the legislature did not distinguish between
legislative and administrative land use decisions, its intent was to impose a uniform standard
of review for those fundamentally different types of decisions.
To reach Bradleys3 conclusion, however, it is necessary to violate two basic rules of
statutory construction. First, cc[w]hen construing statutory language which is plain and
unambiguous, [courts] do not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent." Cole v.
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Tordan School Dist., 899 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). Second, another
"cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts are not to infer substantive terms into
the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language
used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not
expressed." Berrett v. Purser 8c Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994) (citations
omitted).
In Cole, this Court declined to find that the legislature, in amending a statute,
intended to overrule a decision of this Court. Cole at 778. The Court stated that it was
unconvinced the legislature would do so "without a more definite statement as to its
intent.53 Id. See also Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. Sandy City. 879 P.2d
1379, 1383 n. 5 (Utah App. 1992) (declining to find legislative overruling of case law
despite some house debate indicating intent to overrule where "the plain language of the
statutes reveals the action of the legislature did not accomplish that result.55)
There is no real conflict between the "reasonably debatable55 standard of review for
legislative decisions when analyzed in the context of the arbitrary and capricious language of
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. In point of fact, those positions are easily reconciled by a
simple recognition of the fundamental distinction between the character of administrative or
quasi-judicial decisions as opposed to legislative actions. By way of example, long-standing
Utah law has always distinguished between the substantial evidence required for a finding of
arbitrariness or capriciousness in the administrative or quasi-judicial context, e.g., Patterson
v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1995) (review of board
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of adjustment decision), as opposed to determining whether a legislative decision is
arbitrary or capricious based on the more deferential standard of review of a legislative land
use decision. E.g., Gayland, supra at 634-35. The arbitrary and capricious standard has
long been applicable to review of both types of decisions, but has historically involved
distinctively different considerations-substantial evidence for administrative and quasijudicial decisions and judicial deference and reluctance to substitute judicial judgment for
local legislators in the exercise of legislative discretion.
There is nothing evident in the plain language of § 10-9-1001 which would lead to
the conclusion that the legislature intended to extinguish this well-recognized difference in
approach to a review for arbitrary or capricious action. The only reasonable conclusion,
therefore, is that the legislature intended the courts to apply the existing appropriate
standards to the two categories of review of land use decisions by local government. The
Harmon City court agreed, noting the legislative intent to codify existing case law and
standards of judicial interpretation.
We conclude that the 1991 enactment of section 10-9-1001, which
largely codifies the case law cited above, did not alter the deferential
review of a municipality's legislative zoning classification decisions
under the arbitrary and capricious standard.
Harmon City at 1114, 997 P.2d 325.
The Court of Appeals correctly rejected Bradleys3 "one-size-fits-alT argument based
upon the enactment of § 10-9-1001. The appropriate standard of review for legislative land
use decisions under § 10-9-1001 is the "reasonably debatable33 standard.
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B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THIS COURT DID NOT INTEND TO REVERSE FIFTY YEARS
OF WELL REASONED PRECEDENT IN ITS SPRINGVILLE
CITIZENS OPINION.

Given their vehemence about the Court of Appeals3 alleged error in applying the
reasonably debatable standard, Bradleys present a surprisingly cursory and conclusory
discussion of the Springville Citizens opinion.
In Springville Citizens . . . this Court took the broad and plain
language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 at face value, questioning
not whether the Utah Legislature somehow intended that two
different standards of judicial review are to be derived from the single
and simple standard set forth in the statute. In the course of refusing
to distinguish between administrative and legislative functions, this
Court, without reservation, unanimously accepted the Legislature's
plain language and thereby made the "sweeping statement" that "[a]
municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not
supported by substantial evidence.35
Petitioner's Brief pp. 19-20 (citations omitted). The Springville Citizens opinion, however,
merits more serious analysis.
The Springville Citizens case arose in the context of approval by Springville City of a
planned unit development ("PUD") pursuant to city ordinances. Springville Citizens at
HH 1, 2, 979 P.2d 333. The ordinances were already in place and the developer was seeking
approval for a specific PUD. The legal action challenged the City's alleged failure to follow
its own ordinances in complying with certain procedural requirements in the administrative
processing of that request for development approval. Id, at 1112, 979 P.2d 334.
Although, as noted by the Court of Appeals below, this Court "did not discuss
whether it viewed the City of Springville's decision as administrative or legislative." Bradley
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at H 13, 17 P. 3d 1164, it is apparent from the context of the discussion in the opinion that
all of the issues addressed by this Court in Springville Citizens arose from the administrative
processing of the PUD application pursuant to the standards set forth in previously adopted
city ordinances. Illustratively, this Court focused on whether drawings had been certified
by an irrigation company as required by city ordinance (Springville Citizens, 1115); whether
the Planning Commission had reviewed the final plat, engineering drawings and documents
as required by city ordinance (Springville Citizens, 1116); whether modifications required
by the City Council to the final subdivision plat had been referred to the Planning
Commission as required by city ordinance (Springville Citizens, 1117); the allegation that
the City had essentially granted variances without referring them to the Board of
Adjustment in violation of certain state statutory provisions (Springville Citizens, 1118); and
finally, whether certain documents were before the City Council or Planning Commission
at the time they made their respective decisions as required by local ordinance (Springville
Citizens, 11 19). None of these issues address any basic policy decisions involving the
exercise of legislative discretion. The entire inquiry focused exclusively on compliance with
procedural requirements of Springville City ordinance and state statute in the administrative
context.
It is also instructive to look at the authority discussed by this Court in Springville
Citizens. For the proposition that cc[a] municipality's land use decision is arbitrary and
capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence,53 the Court cited Patterson v. Utah
County Bd. of Adjustment supra. Patterson was a review of an administrative decision by a
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board of adjustment granting a special exception for an air strip. What Bradleys are arguing
is that this Court, by referring to a Court of Appeals decision applying the substantial
evidence standard to a review of an administrative decision, intended to overrule 50 years of
case law and begin applying the substantial evidence standard to all subsequent legislative
decisions by local governments in the area of land use and zoning.
The Harmon City court reviewed Springville Citizens and arguments similar to those
asserted by Bradleys and concluded that this Court did not, simply by making a broad
introductory statement about the substantial evidence standard, intend to abandon the
considerable case law supporting the more deferential reasonably debatable standard in the
legislative context. Harmon City at H 19, 997 P.2d 326. The court based its conclusion on
the nature of the underlying municipal action, approval of a PUD "rather than
reclassification of the zoning district," and the challenge asserted, i.e^ that the city failed to
follow its mandatory ordinances which limited its discretion in processing and approving
the PUD. Id. at 11 20, 997 P.2d 326-27. Examining this Court's statement of the
substantial evidence requirement in Springville Citizens, the Harmon City court noted the
authority supporting that statement and concluded that cc[w]e do not think that the
supreme court intended to sweep aside the long-standing distinction between a
municipality's legislative and administrative acts by citing to a case controlled by a statute
[§ 17-27-708] inapposite to review of legislative zoning decisions." Harmon City at 11 24,
997 P.2d 327-28.
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The Court of Appeals below similarly rejected Bradleys arguments and summarized
Harmon City in reaching its conclusion.
Significantly, Harmon City interpreted Sprinjjville Citizens to still
differentiate between administrative and legislative proceedings. This
court determined that Springville Citizens involved judicial review of an
administrative proceeding governed by city ordinances that expressly
limited the city's discretion over PUD approvals. In contrast, Harmon
City involved a request to change the city's zoning which is governed
only by section 10-9-1001(3). In other words, this court
distinguished Springville Citizens because it involved an administrative
proceeding which has traditionally been reviewed under the substantial
evidence standard, whereas Harmon City addressed a legislative
proceeding traditionally reviewed under the reasonably debatable
standard. Thus, according to Harmon City^ the reasonably debatable
standard must be applied when reviewing a municipality's legislative
decisions. Both the substantial evidence and reasonably debatable
standards, however, are alternative aspects of the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. Thus, a municipality's decision is
always reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard; however,
under that standard, an administrative proceeding is viewed
non-deferentially under the substantial evidence standard, while a
legislative proceeding is viewed deferentially under the reasonably
debatable standard.
Bradley at 11 15, 17 P.3d 1164-65 (citations omitted). This conclusion is well-reasoned and
legally correct. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly applied the reasonably debatable
standard to its review of the City's legislative zoning decision.
III.

THE CITY'S DENIAL OF BRADLEY'S REZONING REQUEST WAS
NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL.
The decision of the Payson City Council to deny the Bradley's rezoning request

involved the exercise of legislative discretion making a fundamental policy decision which,
as recognized in Harmon City, is a decision "with which courts will not interfere except in
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the most extreme cases.55 Harmon City at 11 18, 997 P.2d 321. The decision of whether a
use is compatible with adjoining properties is an inherently subjective determination,
implicating political as well as factual considerations. Marshall, supra at 109-10. Similarly,
a decision of whether a requested zoning change is consistent with the municipal policies
stated in a general plan is also subjective. Both inquiries require that fundamental policy
decisions affecting property owners and residents throughout the city be made by the
legislative body.
In these legislative determinations, it is frequently arguable that a different outcome
may also be supportable by facts and information presented to the legislative body. As a
matter of law, however, simply because information before the City Council may have also
justified a different conclusion, that does not render the decision arbitrary, capricious or
illegal or justify a court's substitution of its judgment for that of the local legislative decision
makers. Sandy City at 482; Gayland at 636.
Bradleys would have this Court restrict the type of information which a legislative
body may appropriately consider in exercising its legislative discretion in making policy
decisions regarding zoning matters to the type of evidentiary facts more appropriate to a
quasi-judicial setting. This Court, however, has described a much broader source of
information which may be appropriately considered in making the types of policy choices
involved in the legislative setting.
In support of its contention that the refusal to approve its application
was an arbitrary deprivation of its property rights, plaintiff argues that
the Commission [i.e., the legislative body] improperly heard,
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considered and based its determination on protests and representations
voiced by people representing jealous business interests in the general
area. We do not see any impropriety in the Commission receiving and
taking into account any information they had to offer bearing on the
problem under consideration.
It is important to keep in mind that such a hearing is not of the same
character as a trial, nor even of an administrative hearing or other legal
proceeding, and is not limited by formal rules of procedure or
evidence as they are. In pursuing its authority to zone the county the
Commission is performing a legislative function. It has the
responsibility of advising itself of all pertinent facts as a basis for
determining what is in the public interest in that regard. For this
reason it is entirely appropriate to hold public hearings and to allow
any interested parties it desires to give information and to present their
ideas on the matter. But this is by no means the only source from
which the commissioners may obtain such information. From the fact
that they hold such public offices it is to be assumed that they have
wide knowledge of the various conditions and activities in the county
bearing on the question of proper zoning, such as the location of
businesses, schools, roads and traffic conditions, growth in population
and housing, the capacity of utilities, the existing classification of
surrounding property, and the effect that the proposed reclassification
may have on these things and upon the general orderly development of
the county. In performing their duty it is both their privilege and
obligation to take into consideration their own knowledge of such
matters and also to gather available pertinent information from all
possible sources and give consideration to it in making their
determination.
Gayland at 635-36. As Gayland points out, the public clamor doctrine has no application
when a legislative body acts in a legislative capacity.
Bradleys5 attempt to establish that the City's decision did not meet even the fairly
debatable standard. However, a complete review of the facts available in the legislative
record and the decision of the Court of Appeals establishes just the opposite. For example,
Bradleys point out a potential discrepancy between the narrative policy direction in the
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Payson City General Plan and the map which is part of that document. To the extent there
is some discrepancy or inconsistency between the policy, goals and objectives clearly
articulated by the narrative portion of the general plan and the general plan map, that is
exactly the type of fundamental policy issue that should be reserved to the City Council
rather than the judiciary. The Bradleys would have this Court ignore the clear directive of
the general plan to encourage residential uses to be located east of the natural buffer
provided by 1-15 and provide for industrial zoning in the areas west of 1-15 while relying
exclusively on the depictions in the general plan map. By doing so, Bradleys demonstrate a
fundamental misunderstanding of the reasonably debatable standard when they charge that
the Court of Appeals ignored evidence in support of their position.
Under the reasonably debatable standard, a court only determines whether there is
evidence in the record which would support the decision of the legislative body. Merely
because there may be another reasonable alternative conclusion does not alter the outcome
under the reasonably debatable standard. If there is a choice to be made between two
equally supportable policy options, the Court must defer to the exercise of legislative
discretion by the City Council. For Bradleys to prevail, they cannot simply rely on the
existence of some evidence which would also support their position. Instead, they must
demonstrate that there is no reasonable basis in support of the legislative decision made by
the City Council.
With respect to the Council's traffic concerns, Bradleys argue that the sole evidence
in the record with respect to traffic "were unsupported assertions by citizens with no known
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experience or training in the traffic engineering or planning fields.55 (Petitioner's Brief
p. 24.) Bradleys are relying on a trial level evidentiary standard which this Court rejected in
Gayland, The Council may not only rely on the opinions of residents, but may also rely on
their personal knowledge. Gayland, supra. Merely because there is a conflict between the
opinion of Bradleys5 expert and the opinions of residents, that is an issue for the City
Council to resolve in the exercise of their policy judgment. In addition, in the context of
the legislative process making policy choices, there is more to traffic concerns than mere
quantification. In this case the focus was on the character of industrial traffic conflicting or
being incompatible with the quiet enjoyment of residential uses.
The role of the planning commission in the legislative process is also discretionary
with the legislative body. The planning commission is by definition performing an advisory
role, and the City Council is not bound to follow its recommendation. A council "is not
bound by the commission's findings even if they are supported by substantial evidence.55
Heilman v. City of Roseburg. 591 P.2d 390, 392 (Or.App. 1979). See also 4 Anderson
§ 23.28 at 231. The Municipal Land Use Act does not require a legislative body to follow
the planning commissions recommendation. E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403 (requiring
only submission to planning commission for recommendation). On the other hand, the
Council may choose, at its discretion, to follow a planning commission recommendation.
That recommendation, however, is only one of many considerations before the legislative
body in making policy choices in rendering a zoning decision.
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The Court of Appeals reviewed the record and found evidence, not discussed in
Bradleys3 brief, supporting the City Council's decision.
In this case, the record reveals that virtually all the material presented
to the Planning Commission and to the City Council consisted of
public comment both for and against the zoning change and
presentation of the General Plan and the Planning Zoning Map. Our
review of the record in this case indicates that the City Council
properly considered the public comment and came to a reasonable
decision based on the information before it. Specifically, two
businesses in the area expressed concern over the compatibility of
higher density residential areas with their businesses and the
neighboring industrial zones. One of the businesses submitted a letter
detailing why it located in the area. This business stated it was
attracted to the area because the "master plan ... was far sighted
enough to separate the industrial area from the residential area by a
natural break." The business stated that it operates twenty-four hours
a day with "bright dock lights, and large trucks ... [a] 11 of which would
be a concern for the future residential area that is proposed.55 Another
businessman in the area testified that because his business was
contiguous to the proposed zone change he felt he would be out of
business within a year because neighboring residents would not
tolerate the noise and smell from his fruit processing plant.
Bradley at 11 23, 17 P.3d 1167.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, there was a legitimate concern raised by
business operators in the industrial area west of 1-15. There was also concern expressed by
owners of residential/agricultural property that the animals which they raise may be
offensive to individuals in higher density residential areas, leading to deprivation of their
ability to keep animals on their properties. As to the traffic concerns, the legislative body
was not required to evaluate independent traffic studies, but could give some weight to the
common sense understanding by Council members that adding a large development of
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higher density residential properties would result in an increase of traffic in and around the
area. Only the Council members could determine whether City policy should support
additional spending to accommodate that traffic increase in an area which the general plan
contemplates for industrial use and accommodates existing low density
residential/agricultural uses.
These are all valid concerns to be addressed by the City Council in formulating its
fundamental policy decision with respect to appropriate zoning designations and
development west of 1-15. There is ample evidence in the record demonstrating the
reasonableness of the Council's legislative decision. While there may also have been an
alternative outcome reasonably supported by the record, that is of no import. The
reasonably debatable standard defers judgment to the legislative body where there is some
reasonable basis in the record for the legislative decision. The Court of Appeals correctly
concluded that the City's rejection of Bradley's rezoning application was not arbitrary,
capricious or illegal. That decision should be affirmed.
IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT HAS
ORIGINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER CASES ARISING
FROM LAND USE DECISIONS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES.
Payson City appealed the trial court's reversal of the City Council's decision to deny

the Bradleys5 applications for rezoning directly to this Court. Bradley U 8,17 P.3d at 1163.
This Court then transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals, stating that the appeal was
not within the original appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Id.
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Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to
hear appeals from "adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the
state35 Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i).
That provision is apparently intended to establish a body of expertise in the Court of
Appeals for review of such adjudicative proceedings under the Administrative Procedures
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-0.5, etseq. The Administrative Procedures Act applies to
"all state agency actions." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(l)(a). "Adjudicative proceeding" is
specifically defined as meaning action by a state agency under the Administrative Procedures
Act. The Act specifically excludes in the definition of "agency," "any political subdivision of
the state, or any administrative unit of a political subdivision of the state." Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-2(l)(b). See also. Davis County v. Clearfield City. 756 P.2d 704, 706-707 (UT
App. 1988). The present action is therefore not an "adjudicative proceeding," but rather
consists of a limited judicial review of a local land use decision under Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9-1001.
Despite the fact that no statutory provision expressly grants the Court of Appeals
original jurisdiction over appeals from district court review of land use decisions by the
governing body of a municipality, in an attempt to reconcile this apparent confusion, the
Court of Appeals concluded that it "must have jurisdiction." Id. 11 9 at 1163. In order to
accommodate that conclusion, the court was forced to strain the statutory language
regarding its jurisdiction by inferring substantive provisions not present in that language.
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The supreme court, however, seems to have consistentiy determined
that it does not have original appellate jurisdiction over zoning cases
under the catch-all provision found in section 78-2-2(3)(j).
Accordingly, this court must have jurisdiction. Examining section
78-2a-3, the only provision that could apply is subsection (2)(b)(i)
which gives this court jurisdiction over "appeals from the district court
review of adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions
of the state or other local agencies....55 Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) (1996). As Payson City's counsel noted, however,
this case does not arise from an "adjudicative" proceeding, but rather a
legislative proceeding. Nevertheless, in order to effectuate the
supreme court's order transferring these appeals to this court,
"adjudicative53 must be read broadly to include both administrative and
legislative proceedings of state political subdivisions and local
governments. Thus, read in conjunction with section 78-2-2,
governing the supreme court's jurisdiction, section 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i)
confers original appellate jurisdiction to this court over this matter.
Bradley 119, at 1163-64.
This conclusion is legally unsupportable. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is
defined by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2). There is no provision within § 78-2a-3(2) which
expressly grants the Court of Appeals jurisdiction over land use decisions of local
governmental entities. It is therefore logical to conclude that this Court has appellate
jurisdiction over those decisions under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) which provides that
this Court has jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.35
Two rules of statutory construction are applicable in this analysis. First, it is a basic
rule of statutory construction that courts interpret statutes according to the plain language
of the statute. E.g., Hercules Inc. v. State Tax Comm5n. 877 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah 1994);
Schurtz v. BMW of North America. Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108,1112 (Utah 1991). Second, as
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discussed above, a court may not derive substantive meaning from the statutory language
which does not exist in that language. Berrett v. Purser &: Edwards at 370.
Under the rules of statutory construction as applied to the provisions governing
appellate jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that it has original appellate
jurisdiction over land use decisions by local governmental bodies. Proper construction of
the statutes yields the conclusion that this Court has jurisdiction over those appeals pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).3
CONCLUSION
Utah law has long recognized the critical distinction between the appropriate
standard for judicial review of legislative decisions as opposed to administrative actions by
local governmental entities, such as municipalities. Legislative land use decisions have
appropriately been afforded broad judicial deference and upheld if it is fairly or reasonably
debatable whether the action taken is in furtherance of the public health, safety and general
welfare. There is nothing in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 which supports the conclusion
that the legislature intended to overrule that long-standing judicial deference to local
legislative decisions. It is also unreasonable to assume that this Court, in referring to
decisions made in an administrative context in Springville Citizens, intended to abolish that
well-established rule of judicial deference and impose the substantial evidence standard on
legislative decisions by municipalities. The Court of Appeals carefully analyzed the
3

This conclusion obviously does not preclude the Court of Appeals from hearing
appeals of these legislative decisions which are filed with this Court and transferred to it
pursuant to §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j).
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applicable law and correctly concluded that the "reasonably debatable" measure rather than
the "substantial evidence" standard applies to judicial review of local legislative land use
decisions under § 10-9-1001. That legal conclusion should be affirmed.
The bottom line is that it is reasonably debatable whether rezoning to permit higher
density multi-family residential development on lots as small as 7500 square feet is
consistent with the policy goals and objectives articulated in the Payson City General Plan,
which encourages industrial uses to be concentrated in the natural commercial corridor west
of 1-15 and future residential uses to be located east of 1-15. This quintessential exercise of
legislative discretion by the Payson City Council necessarily involves an inherently political
and subjective determination of what is in the best interests of the residents of the City.
Under these circumstances, consistent with a large body of well-reasoned precedent, this
Court should respectfully decline the invitation to reject that standard and defer to the
exercise of legislative discretion by the Payson City Council. Applying the correct standard
to the record before the Court of Appeals leads to the conclusion that the decision of the
City Council in denying the Bradleys3 rezoning request was not arbitrary, capricious or
illegal. That conclusion by the Court of Appeals should be upheld.
Finally, this Court should correct the error of the Court of Appeals in straining the
rules of statutory construction to support the conclusion that it has original appellate
jurisdiction over land use decisions by local governmental entities. The clear and
unambiguous language of the statute places original appellate jurisdiction over such cases in
this Court, although it may obviously elect in the exercise of its discretion to transfer such
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appeals on a case-by-case basis to the Court of Appeals. As a matter of public policy, it is
important that final decisions of the legislative bodies of counties and municipalities are
potentially reviewable on a direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, rather than only by
way of a petition for writ of certiorari.
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